We introduce the logic of bunched implications, BI, in which multiplicative (or linear) and additive (or intuitionistic) implications live side-by-side. We provide a truth conditional semantics, a proof theory and a categorical semantics of proofs.
Introduction
We introduce the logic of bunched implications, BI, in which multiplicative (or linear) and additive (or intuitionistic) implications live side-by-side. We provide a truth conditional semantics, a proof theory and a categorical semantics of proofs. We explain how BI arises as a logic of resources and sketch a development of this computational interpretation, which is quite di erent from that of linear logic 6], in the setting of logic programming. Our view of logic programming is based on analytic resolution-based proof-search, a perspective to which we appeal throughout the sequel. Predicate BI, used in our account of logic programming, admits not only the usual (additive) quanti ers but also multiplicative (or intensional) quanti ers if the kind long sought in relevant logic 22].
We begin, in x 1.1, by introducing Kripke Resource Semantics and proceed, x 1.2, to introduce bunches. We proceed, x 2 to give BI's natural deduction system, NBI, including a sketch of its associated -calculus, . In x 2.3, we explain the soundness of NBI for Kripke Resource Semantics. In x 3, we present a semantics for BI's proofs (which can be read as -terms) using doubly closed categories. In x 4 , we explain that BI admits both additive and multiplicative quanti ers, give both proof theory and a semantics. In x 5, we explain the computational interpretation of BI in the setting of logic programming and, nally, in x 6, we discuss a few topics of ongoing research at the date of this article.
This article includes ideas and results which have been presented in 17, 16, 19, 20] to which we refer the reader for more extensive discussions of many of the topics mentioned herein. In particular, the relationship between BI, linear logic and other relevant logics is discussed in, for example, 17].
Kripke Resource Semantics
The notion of resource is a primitive in informatics. Examples of resources include space and time, and the eld of complexity theory has been developed speci cally to deal with these notions, using hierarchies of complexity to classify algorithms. In the setting of logic programming, we can, for now, usefully think of two (intensional) kinds of resource: at the propositional level, we have occurrences in programs of atoms and clauses; at the predicate level, we have the (variables occurring in) answer substitutions.
From the (perhaps) more general point of view of semantics, we can identify the following essential aspects of a resource:
(1) There should be identi able units or elements of the resource; (2) There should be a zero unit of resource; (3) There should be an operation which combines two units of the resource (for now, we won't care about the order of combination); (4) There should be a way of comparing two units of the resource.
In short, we require a resource to be a preordered commutative monoid, which we call a Kripke Resource Monoid, M = (M; e ; ; v); in which we require the following bifunctoriality condition: if m v m 0 and n v n 0 ; then m n v m 0 n 0 :
Formally, this semantics amounts to the one given by Urqhuart 24] , based on the idea of \pieces of information", for the ( ? , )-fragment of intuitionistic linear logic (or MILL) 6] . Note also that Kripke Resource Monoids can be understood to subsume the preorders used in Kripke's \possible worlds" The clauses for the multiplicatives are more interesting, following Urquhart's semantics for MILL: m j = i for some n; n 0 2 M n n 0 v m and n j = and n 0 j = ) m j = ? i for all y 2 M (n j = implies m n j = ):
The case for can be read as requiring that a resource be partitioned into components which force the constituents of the proposition. We must take All propositions must satisfy the familiar monotonicity property from intuitionistic logic:
Kripke Monotonicity (or Hereditary) : m j = and m v n implies n j = .
We write m j = ? if m j = ? , where ? is proposition obtained from ? by replacing each \;" with^and each \," with . We write ? j = M i , for all m 2 M, m j = ? implies m j = . We write ? j = i , for all KRMs M, ? j = M .
The forcing m j = can read as \ holds with cost m" or \ holds according to the information m".
Example 1 A simple example is provided by the monoid N = (IN; +; 0; ), the standard natural numbers ordered by less than. If we interpret ? as function from to , with cost m, and as the argument to this function, with cost n, then the cost of computing the result of the function application is m + n.
Note that the distributive law,
holds in Kripke Resource Semantics.
So far, we have considered a primitive notion of resource. In particular, we have paid no attention to the following two key aspects of resource semantics:
The location of a resource; and The ownership of a resource.
Just as propositional BI has a computational interpretation 17, 16] , so does predicate BI 17, 18] , wherein location and ownership can be studied. In x 5, we describe a computational interpretation of BI within which these notions can be seen to emerge. Predicate BI is presented in detail in 20].
Bunches
Starting from Kripke Resource Semantics, it is natural to ask for a prooftheoretic characterization. From this point of view, the key issue is the formulation of the two implications, ! and ? .
Recall that implication is inextricably bound up with conjunction, or with antecedent-forming operations used to formulate sequents. This connection goes so far that it is sometimes said that an introduction rule The remainder of the proof theory builds on the distinction between \," and \;". We stipulate that Contraction and Weakening are possible for \;" but not for \,".
In this scheme, the antecedents are no longer sequences, but are trees with leaves labelled with propositions and internal nodes labelled by \," or \;", or in short, bunches 5,2,22]. 
_E
Notice that the introduction and elimination rules for additive and multiplicative implications, conjunctions and units are identical in form. The di erence between them is the antecedent-combining operations they use. Because \;" admits Weakening and Contraction, rules where additive maintenance is ex-plicit are admissible:
The question of whether these rules can replace the more explicit ones above is delicate 16, 19] .
The following version of the cut rule of sequent calculus is also admissible:
Note that this rule covers both the \;" and \," cases in the construction of bunches.
The -calculus
The calculus NBI gives rise to a simply-typed -calculus, . Brie y, the types of are given by BI's propositions and contexts are given by bunches in which types are labelled with variables. We assume that no variable occurs twice in any bunch. The terms are given just as in the usual simply-typed and linear -calculi. The main novelty in concerns -abstraction itself.
Since contexts are labelled bunches, a context ? can be extended in the following two ways:
? respectively. We obtain an application rule, together with -and -laws, corresponding to each of these abstractions.
, which is normalizing, stands in propositions-as-types correspondence with BI.
Some Metatheory
We can establish the soundness of NBI for Kripke Resource Semantics. Proposition 2 (soundness) If ?` is provable in NBI, then ? j = .
The proof of Proposition 2 proceeds via a straightforward induction on the structure of proofs in NBI. We omit the details.
One important property of BI is that it is conservative over both MILL and IL. In the case of IL, this means that 1 ; : : : ; n` is provable in BI i 1 ; : : : ; n` is provable in IL, where each i and is a formula built up using additive connectives only. For this result, fg a plays the role of the empty context in IL. For MILL the statement is similar, using \," and fg m and formulae built from multiplicatives. That these conservativity properties hold can be seen straightforwardly from a semantics of BI's proof theory.
Doubly Closed Categories
In order to explain the structure of a proof theory, it is usually useful to give a categorical description of it, where the connectives enjoy universal properties and satisfy naturality conditions, in the spirit of Brouwer-HeytingKolmogorov.
In order to do this for BI, note that the semantics of proofs for IL is given using cartesian closed categories (I; ; !) and that the semantics for MILL using symmetric monoidal closed categories (1; ; ? ). In each case, the introduction rule for implication corresponds to an adjunction where the internal hom is a right adjoint: to a cartesian product, for IL, and a tensor product, for MILL.
To model BI we simply ask for a category that has all the structure necessary to model both MILL and IL.
A doubly closed category, or DCC for short, is a category equipped with two monoidal closed structures. A DCC is called cartesian if one of the closed structures is cartesian and the other symmetric monoidal and bicartesian if it also has nite coproducts.
Brie y, models of proofs for BI are given using bicartesian respectively, and to the tree-like structure of antecedents.
We will not give a detailed interpretation of BI's proofs, which can be read as -terms, in a bicartesian DCC here. For our present purposes, the main point is that any BI proof of a judgement ?` determines a morphism ? ! in a DCC, where the interpretation of formulae and bunches uses the corresponding DCC structure. This gives us a form of soundness of the the proof theory wrt DCC semantics; completeness results also hold 19, 20] .
The assignment of morphisms to derivations is straightforward, with -terms being interpreted in the usual way, the additives following the pattern for simply-typed -calculus with products and sums 12], and the multiplicatives following the pattern for the linear -calculus with a tensor product; see, for example, 3]. One point that deserves comment concerns disjunction. To interpret the elimination rule for _ we need to use distributivity of + over both and . To see why we get the needed distributivities in bicartesian DCCs note rst that, since E (?) and E (?) are both left adjoints, they both preserve all colimits. Second, + is a coproduct. It follows that we have the isomorphisms
The conservativity of BI over IL can be seen immediately in terms of DCCs. For suppose C is a categorical model of IL, i.e., a bicartesian closed category.
Then we can regard it as a bicartesian DCC, in which the two closed structures are the same. When we restrict to the additive fragment of BI, this shows that the denotations of BI proofs are exactly the same as those in the model of IL.
The DCC semantics suggests some (at rst sight) slightly unusual properties. In particular, a morphism from E to F can variously be viewed as a map I ?! E ? F or 1 ?! E ! F using the adjunctions and, indeed, we have the following isomorphisms of hom sets: These points can readily be understood in a particular example of a DCC.
Example 3 Set Set is bicartesian closed, with coproducts and cartesian closed structure de ned pointwise from their corresponding versions in Set. A symmetric monoidal closed structure is given by
More generally, if M is a commutative monoid, considered as a discrete monoidal category, then Set M op is a bicartesian DCC; in this example M is the twoelement commutative monoid f0; 1g with addition modulo two. This example does not appear to convey any particularly useful computational ideas, but we can use it to make a few remarks, q.v. 16, 17, 19] .
(1) It is a non-degenerate model, in that I is not a terminal object and is not cartesian product. So the de nition of DCCs does not somehow induce a collapse of the speci ed structure. (2) There are no maps in the model from 1 to I.
are not convertible to one another in the linear version of the bunched language.
(4) There is no functor ! : Set Set ! Set Set admitting an isomorphism !E ? F = E ! F, thus indicating that a DCC is not simply a model of linear logic in disguise. To see the remark, consider that (1; 0) ! (2; 2) = (2; 1) but that, no matter what C is, C ? (2; 2) = (X; Y ) for sets X and Y of the same cardinality. Therefore, for any \!" we try to pick, !E ? (2; 2) cannot be (2; 1). We can generate a rich class of models of BI using a general construction due to Brian Day 4] . Day shows that any monoidal (not necessarily closed) category (C; ; I) induces a monoidal closed structure on the functor category Set C op , and that when (C; ; I) is symmetric monoidal so is Set C op . This, combined with the standard fact that Set C op is bicartesian closed, yields a host of bicartesian DCCs.
The construction is as follows: The unit I of the monoidal structure is C ?; I].
Given functors E and F, the formula for the tensor product is written using a co-end: Day's construction gives us a way of embedding any symmetric monoidal closed category into a bicartesian DCC: we apply the Yoneda embedding C ?! Set C op , which sends X to C ?; X]. It is standard that Yoneda is full and faithful, and it is not di cult to show that it preserves monoidal closed structure 16]. From this we may conclude that BI is conservative over MILL, again not only on the level of provability but also on the semantics of proofs.
An observation that is useful for working with the tensor product is that we 
Quanti ers
The predicate version of BI has the familiar intuitionistic quanti ers 8 and 9. It also has intensional quanti ers, obtained by observing structural restrictions on the level of terms as well as propositions. This is formulated using a notion of bunch of variables, which is separate from bunches of propositions.
We describe this here using a single-sorted version of predicate BI.
Bunches of variables
x is used to range over variables, and X over bunches of variables.
X ::= x j X; X j X; X j ; m j ; a Bunches of variables are subject to the linearity restriction: any variable appears at most once in a bunch.
Judgements
We consider terms-and propositions-in-context, with a syntax of the form X`t : Term and X` : Prop which assert that a term or predicate is well-formed in context X 13]. Constants and predicate letters are given by schematic judgements and, as in the bunched logic itself, Contraction and Weakening are allowed for \;" but not for \,". We omit a formal de nition and move on to consider the quanti ers.
Logical judgements have the form (X) ?`
asserting that E is a consequence of ?, where the terms and atomic predicates in the sequent are well formed according to X. The idea of the introduction rule for 8 new is that we may infer 8 new x : in the usual way for universal quanti cation, except that the variable x must sit in multiplicative combination with all of the other variables. In the elimination rule, we must be careful not to substitute an arbitrary term for x, but only one that is respective of the multiplicative relationship between x and other variables in X. In particular, t cannot contain any of these other variables appearing in X; this requirement is implemented by the linearity restriction, which can be interpreted as requiring that the term t be constructed using variables that are new to the propositional consequence. The universal introduction rules have the usual restriction that x must not occur in ?; similarly, the existential elimination rules have the restriction that x must not occur in or .
A consequence of these observations is that it is inappropriate to read 8 new literally as \for all". Rather, we must take into account that in 8 new x : E the multiplicative relationship between x and other variables must be observed.
In terms of the sharing interpretation, q.v. The di erence between 8 and 8 new is that the former considers elements d 2 D(n) only in accessible worlds where n v m, where for the latter we look to a completely separate world n, and then use the monoid operation to combine it with m.
The multiplicative existential is di erent in another respect to its additive counterpart. The additive 9, from intuitionistic logic, is often described as being \local", in that the de nition stays at the same world, where for 8 you travel to accessible worlds to nd elements. The multiplicative 9 new does not stay at the same world when it looks for an element that exists, but neither does it travel along accessible lines; it hops to an arbitrary world, accessible or not, to nd an element, and then considers the resulting formula in an environment formed by multiplicative combination.
We remark that the soundness result, sketched for propositional BI in x 2.3, can be extended to predicate BI.
We conclude this section with one further point, rst mentioned in the introduction. The inclusion of bunched structure on the levelof individuals raises the question of how this information will be incorporated in the rules for propositional connectives. For each connective we must choose whether to follow multiplicative or additive maintenance on the level of individuals. The most common cases for multiplicative connectives are in fact cross cases, where a multiplicative connective allows the same variable to be shared between its components (this approach is taken, for example, in predicate versions of linear logic and indeed in the linear logic programming languages Lygon 7, 21] and Lolli 8] ). In BI, we also have the more radical possibility of multiplicative maintenance. This issue is discussed fully in 20].
5 Logic Programming
Background
The proof-theoretic account of logic programming is simple and elegant. A program is expressed as an antecedent (or context), P, of a sequent and a goal is expressed as a succedent, typically existentially quanti ed. A goal 9x:G is often written in the Prolog style as G(X), with X described as a \logical variable". The whole sequent, P ?-9x:G, is interpreted as a request to calculate a pair ( ; ) in which is an answer substitution for X and is a proof of the sequent P`G .
Operationally, we must describe how execute a program when it is supplied with a goal. Recall rst that inference rules can be read as a reduction operators, from conclusion to premisses. ( Kleene 11] explains this in the case of the classical predicate calculus.) Such operators are the basic units of proof-search, or backward chaining, just as inference rules are the basic units of deduction, or forward chaining.
A semantics based on goal-directed proof-search is computationally appealing. Fix a program, P, and proceed, informally, as follows:
Given a complex goal, G, we rst reduce G by applying, as a reduction operator, the introduction rule which corresponds to the outermost connective of G. This reduction process is repeated until all remaining goal formulae are atomic. For example, given the goal G 1^( G 2 ! G 3 ), we construct the tree . . .
Note that upper rightmost step adds G 2 to the program; Given an atomic goal, A, we invoke the program, using a resolution step.
Suppose the program includes a proposition of the form 8x:G ! B, in which B is atomic, such that there is a substitution for x such that B = A. Then we can immediately proceed to the sub-goal B :
This operational semantics has several desirable features. Most importantly, it is not very non-deterministic, thereby reducing the need for backtracking to an acceptable level. because the roots and leaves of each gure are the same. Note, however, the following problem with : Although 1 2` 1 2 is trivially provable, it is easy to see that it has no uniform proof. At rst sight, this suggests that if is to be permitted in goals, then it must be excluded from programs. However, we can include in programs P provided we compute not with P but with P], its clausal decompostion, and provided we restrict ourselves to -products of clauses of the form A (atoms), 8x:G ! A or 8 new x:G ? A. Given P( ), we de ne P( )] = P( ; ). Similarly, we can take^-products of clauses and de ne P( ^ )] = P( ; ). The mapping ?] has no e ect on clauses themselves. 1 Thus we arrive at the following classes of programs and goals, de ned by a mutual induction:
Program clauses P ::= A j 8x:G ! A j 8 new x:G ? A j P^P j P P As we have seen, the proof that uniform proofs are complete for hereditary
Harrop sequents relies most naturally on a presentation of BI as a sequent calculus 19], in which the elimination rules are replaced by \left rules" which introduce connectives to the left-hand sides of sequents. Provided we restrict our attention to normal proofs, such a presentation is equivalent to the natural deduction one. The details of these arguments are beyond the scope of our present purposes. However, it will be helpful to consider the resolution rule itself in a bit more detail. Recall that our treatment of quanti ers required the introduction of a collection of variables to sequents, (X) ?`G denoting that X is the set of rst-order variables occurring in ? and G. Resolution makes explicit use of these variables.
In predicate BI, the elimination rule for ? 20] 
respectively, i.e., in which the minor premiss is an axiom. This structure allows resolution to be a unary rule and so reduces the complexity of the proof-search procedure. The proof that uniform proofs of (the clausal form of) hereditary Harrop sequents can always be expressed proceeds by showing that all rules occuring above the minor premiss of an implication left rule can permuted below the rule. we defer the details to 18].
Whilst the behaviour of the additive clauses is familiar from Prolog-like languages, the multiplicative clauses provided by BI have a di erent interpretation which provides an account of local variables and interference in logic programming. An example will illustrate these ideas.
Consider a simple version of the famous \blocks world" 23], in which a robotic arm is supposed to manipulate blocks, here labelled x , y and z. Suppose further that we wish to remove from the computation | imagine perhaps that it is a construction process | any components that may be defective. A sketch of a possible program P follows the diagram:
x we get the following instance of resolution:
where G = empty ready.
Here it follows immediately that x, the possibly defective block, can take no further part in the computation, which proceeds up the left-hand branch. Had we taken a version of remove in the Prolog-like style, x could have persisted on the left-hand branch, thereby required additional code to enforce its absence from further constructions.
Thus the use of x in this setting is local to the invocation of the clause for \remove" and x cannot be shared by \remove" and other clauses. This is in contrast to the situation arising from additive resolutions, in which the variables used in (fragments of) answer substitutions are global and can be shared. More generally, given two clauses Again, this is re ected in the semantic clause for the quanti er: (X) u j m j = 8 new x : i 8n : 8d 2 F(n) : (X; x) u; d] j n m j = Here the environment for the instantiated clause is formed by taking Day's product of an environment for the whole clause with the interpretation of the substitution determined by the resolution step. The use of the tensor product ensures the disjointness of components of the compound environment, corresponding, in the terms of the Blocks World example, to the locality of the calculated instance of remove(x). These topics will be developed further in 18].
Discussion
We have omitted several aspects of logic programming with BI. The following are perhaps the most immediately important:
Herbrand models and xed point semantics. We have discussed both prooftheoretic semantics (an abstract operational semantics) and model-theoretic semantics for logic programming with BI. We have paid little attention to denotational semantics. In logic programming, as found in, for example, 9], the established method of giving a denotational semantics is to construct a \minimal" Herbrand or term model as follows: De ne a sequence of term models (H n ) n 0 such that H n+1 = T(H n ), where T is an operator which corresponds to all of the possible resolution steps, starting from the propositions which hold in H n : T is shown to be monotonic and continuous on the complete lattice of Herbrand models and so, by the Knaster-Tarski xed point theorem, to have a least xed point, T ! (?), where ? is the least element of the lattice. In the BI setting, such a construction is more complex, owing to the absence of the classical structural rules, and the detailed formulation remains to be settled. Modularity and scoping. Miller 14] has shown how intuitionistic hereditary Harrop formulae can be used as a basis for a logical account of modules in logic programming. The basic idea is that modules, i.e., programs, consist of sets of clauses. A module M 2 imports a module M 1 by replacing each of its clauses 8x:G ! A by 8x:(M 1 ! G) ! A;
in which we interpret M 1 as the the single formula consisting of the conjunction its clauses. In the BI setting, we not only have the option of importing modules using !, as above, but can also use ? . The computational signi cance of these choices remains a topic of study. This view of modularity appears to provide an approach to a logical account of resource location.
Turning to scoping, BI opens up several possibilities. One arises from the intensional quanti ers, as in the Blocks World example. Another arises at the purely predicate level, via the \cross cases", i.e., multiplicative variable maintenance with additive connectives and vice versa, for each propositional connective. This view of scoping appears to provide an approach to a logical account of resource ownership. Intensional quanti ers in Prolog-like logic programming. We suggest that it would be interesting to consider the addition of multiplicative variables and quanti ers to Prolog-like languages, i.e., even in the absence of the multi- giving access to some of the features, e.g., local variables, we have discussed.
